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Testing the Limits: Judicial Enforcement of
Positive State Constitutional Rights
Lawrence Friedman*
Negative rights-limitations on government action-preoccupy
discourse about individual rights in American constitutional law.
In no small part this is because the U.S. Constitution concerns itself
only with these rights; the First Amendment, for example, protects
us from certain kinds of government interference with speech or re-
ligious freedom. But once we expand our focus beyond the federal
constitution, we see, as the political scientist Emily Zackin has ex-
plained, that the American state constitutional tradition contains
within it a distinct commitment to numerous positive rights-to
various means by which citizens may seek protection "from threats
that are not solely from the state itself."1
Zackin's book, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Why
State Constitutions Contain America's Positive Rights, explores the
positive rights tradition in state constitutional law in three areas:
public education, labor relations, and environmental protection. 2
The state constitutional provisions concerning environmental pro-
tection are illustrative. These provisions come in many flavors. The
Illinois Constitution protects the right of each citizen "to a healthful
environment,"3 while the New Mexico Constitution directs the state
legislature to "provide for control of pollution and control of despoil-
ment of the air, water and other natural resources. '4 As Zackin
observes, their framers designed these provisions not to limit gov-
ernment or prevent tyranny, "but to mandate more active govern-
ment involvement in order to protect people from life in a despoiled
environment and from those who would despoil it."'5
* Professor of Law, New England Law I Boston. I prepared this essay at the invitation
of the editors of the Duquesne Law Review for its issue dedicated to current topics in state
constitutional law. Thanks to Jordy Singer and Bob Williams for comments and suggestions,
and to my research assistant, Sara Conway, for all of her hard work.
1. EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE
CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA'S POSITIVE RIGHTS 40 (Princeton Univ. Press 2013).
2. See id. at 16-17.
3. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
4. N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 21.
5. ZACKIN, supra note 1, at 170.
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In this essay I recount the story of one such protection: article I,
section 27-the Pennsylvania Constitution's Environmental Rights
Amendment (the "ERA")-which provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values
of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources
are the common property of all the people, including genera-
tions yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Common-
wealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all
the people.6
Though the goals of environmental protection might have been
clear to the framers of the ERA-"an amendment that would give
the natural environment the same kind of constitutional protection
as had been given to political rights" 7 -the courts of the Common-
wealth over several decades did not define a clear path for judicial
implementation of the provision.8 But the story does not end there:
in a 2013 decision, Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, a plural-
ity of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Ronald
Castille, articulated a new approach to judicial enforcement of the
ERA-an approach that, despite the questions it raises, may yet
serve as a model for state courts seeking to make sense of similar
positive rights provisions.
This essay proceeds as follows. First, I briefly summarize the
prior stance of the Pennsylvania courts toward enforcement of the
ERA, and discuss some of the reasons why state courts might back
away from vigorous enforcement of positive rights provisions. Next,
I review the plurality opinion in Robinson Township and the ap-
proach to the ERA that it articulates. Finally, I venture some pre-
liminary thoughts on the plurality's approach and the questions it
raises about judicial implementation of state constitutional positive
rights provisions.
I
The people of Pennsylvania ratified the ERA in 1971. 9 The rela-
tively few cases in which the ERA had been a subject of litigation
6. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
7. Robinson Twp., Wash. Cnty. v. Commonwealth., 83 A.3d 901, 962 n.50 (Pa. 2013).
8. See John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It Pro-
tects the Environment: Part I-An Interpretative Framework for Article , Section 27, 103
DICK. L. REV. 693, 724-25 (1999) (discussing diminished role of ERA).
9. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 962.
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over the next four decades typically fell into one of two categories,
either "challenges to specific private or governmental development
projects, which implicated alleged violations of constitutional envi-
ronmental rights," or "challenges to local or state-wide environmen-
tal quality laws, which implicated alleged violations of constitu-
tional property rights."10 In the former category, the courts cohered
around an analytical approach to the ERA that "tended to define
the broad constitutional rights [it contains] in terms of compliance
with various statutes and, as a result, to minimize [its] constitu-
tional import."1 Indeed, the Robinson Township plurality observed
that, for the lower courts, "the viability of constitutional claims
premised upon the Environmental Rights Amendment was limited
by whether the General Assembly had acted and by the General
Assembly's policy choices, rather than by the plain language of the
amendment.1 2 Judicial enforcement of the ERA, on this under-
standing, was effectively "contingent upon and constrained by leg-
islative action."1 3
The Robinson Township plurality accordingly concluded that,
contrary to the expectations of the ERA's framers, "the provision
has not yet led to the development of an environmental rights juris-
prudence comparable to the tradition of political rights jurispru-
dence."1 4 Zackin reaches a similar conclusion in Looking for Rights
in All the Wrong Places regarding like provisions in other state con-
stitutions, noting that state courts "have not used the environmen-
tal rights in state constitutions to support the aims of the environ-
mental movement or fulfill the hopes of their advocates. '15
Lack of judicial enforcement of positive rights in state constitu-
tions isn't uncommon. Though the meaning of positive rights pro-
visions might emerge with some clarity from litigation about the
provision in question, judicial acknowledgement that, say, a provi-
sion concerning protection of the environment mandates action by
the government, does not necessarily lead the court to order the leg-
islature to take that action.16 Compelling the political branches to
10. Id. at 964.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 966.
13. Id. at 967.
14. Id. at 969.
15. ZACKIN, supra note 1, at 191.
16. Lawrence Friedman, Rights in Front of Our Eyes: Positive Rights and the American
Constitutional Tradition, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 609, 615 (2014) (reviewing EMILY ZACKIN,
LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN
AMERICA'S POSITIVE RIGHTS); see also Elizabeth Pascal, Welfare Rights in State Constitu-
tions, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 864 (2008) (noting that "positive rights enforcement requires a
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act entails real risks for a court: the legislature or the governor
could simply ignore the court's decision, 17 or even seek to punish the
court, either through the state's budget or by altering the process
by which judges are selected.18 Any of these outcomes potentially
could undermine either the legitimacy of the courts or their ability
to administer justice. As a result, enforcement efforts may be tepid,
or courts may, upon further reflection, pull back from enforcement
efforts that were once more robust.1 9 Absent some enforcement
mechanism, commitments to positive rights, such as environmental
protection, will understandably appear hollow.20
In light of the potential hazards associated with judicial enforce-
ment of positive rights, litigants seeking to vindicate these rights
need to chart a new way forward, one that envisions some kind of
judicial enforcement of these obligations and that blunts the poten-
tial risks to the judiciary's legitimacy or its ability to function opti-
mally. The approach endorsed by Chief Justice Castille's plurality
opinion in Robinson Township suggests just such a path. Under
this approach, the Pennsylvania courts may yet play a role in en-
forcing the Commonwealth's constitutional obligation to protect the
environment. Let's turn now to the Robinson Township plurality.
II
In February 2012, Pennsylvania Governor Thomas W. Corbett
signed Act 13 into law.21 The law declared statewide limitations on
oil and gas development and set distance restrictions on well per-
mitting.22 One section granted the Department of Environmental
Protection authority to waive setback restrictions regarding the
construction of wells near water, while another effectively elimi-
nated any muncicipal right to appeal or seek any other review of
court to obligate the legislature to act, thus entering into the arena traditionally reserved for
the political branches").
17. See Mark C. Miller, Conflicts Between the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and
the Legislature: Campaign Finance Reform and Same-Sex Marriage, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 279,
291 (2006) (discussing failure of Massachusetts legislature to honor its constitutional obliga-
tions to either fund or repeal clean elections law).
18. See Friedman, supra note, 16, at 616.
19. See, e.g., Hancock v. Comm'r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1155-56 (Mass. 2005) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring) (retreating from earlier position regarding judicial enforcement of obli-
gations created by positive right to public education).
20. See Ellen Wiles, Aspirational Principles or Enforceable Rights? The Future for Socio-
Economic Rights in National Law, 22 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 35, 36 (2006).
21. Act No. 13 of Feb. 14, 2012, P.L. 87, eff. immediately (in part) and Apr. 16, 2012 (in
part), 58 Pa.C.S. §§ 2301-3504 (amending the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act); see also Rob-
inson Twp., Wash. Cnty. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 915 (Pa. 2013).
22. See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3201-3274 (2012).
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the department's decision on a well permit.23 The law required
statewide uniformity in zoning ordinances regarding the develop-
ment of oil and gas resources. 24 It prohibited local regulation of oil
and gas operations, and announced that environmental acts regu-
lating oil and gas operation occupy the entire field of regulation. 25
Finally, the law mandated uniform zoning ordinances, prohibited
municipalities from imposing conditions on oil and gas operations,
and allowed such operations in residential districts.26
In March 2012, several Pennsylvania municipalities, two resi-
dents and elected officials, the Delaware Riverkeeper Network, and
a Pennsylvania physician (collectively, the "plaintiffs") challenged
Act 13 in the Commonwealth Court, arguing that the law violated
article I, sections 1, 10, and 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, as
well as article III, sections 3 and 32.27 The plaintiffs also main-
tained that Act 13 was unconstitutionally vague and a violation of
both the separation of powers and the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. 28 The Office of the Pennsylvania Attorney Gen-
eral, the Public Utility Commission, and the Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection (together, the "defendants") objected and the
parties filed cross-applications for summary relief.29 In July 2012,
an en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court held certain of Act
13's provisions unconstitutional and enjoined their enforcement. 30
The parties cross-appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylva-
nia.31 A four-Justice majority declared several provisions of Act 13
unconstitutional, though the majority did not agree on a single ra-
tionale. 32 Chief Justice Castille's plurality opinion concluded that
23. See id. §§ 3215(b)(4), (d).
24. See id. §§ 3301-3309.
25. See id. § 3303.
26. See id.
27. Robinson Twp., Wash. Cnty. v. Commonwealth., 83 A.3d 901, 915-16 (Pa. 2013); PA.
CONST. art. I, § 1 (inherent rights of mankind); PA. CONST. art. I, § 10 (eminent domain); PA.
CONST. art. I, § 27 (preservation of natural resources and the public estate); PA. CONST. art.
III, § 3 (single subject bills); PA. CONST. art. III, § 32 (special laws).
28. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 916; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
29. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 916. The court sustained defendants' objections to eight
counts of plaintiffs' petition and overruled objections to four counts, granting summary relief
in favor of plaintiff on those four counts and denying defendants summary relief altogether.
Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 913.
32. Chief Justice Castille, joined by Justice Todd, and Justice McCaffery concluded the
law violated the ERA. Id. Justice Bear concurred, but would have resolved the case on
substantive due process grounds. Id. at 1000-14. Justices Saylor and Eakin dissented. Id.
at 1014-16. Former Justice Orie Melvin took no part in the decision. Id. at 1000.
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several core provisions of Act 13 violated the Commonwealth's obli-
gations under ERA.33
On appeal, the defendants argued that the lower court had vio-
lated the separation of powers by "interfere[ing] with the exercise
of the General Assembly's constitutional police powers" by second-
guessing legislative choices and inserting its own "policy judgments
and preferences," when it should have refrained from acting at all.34
The defendants maintained that the General Assembly had the au-
thority to retract local governments' ability to regulate oil and gas
operations, and that merely by reaching the merits, the court had
encroached upon an area reserved exclusively to legislative discre-
tion. 35 Further, the defendants argued that, because the constitu-
tion failed to articulate any manageable standards that would allow
a court "reasonably assess the merits of the General Assembly's pol-
icy choices," the court must refrain from deciding the case. 36
The plaintiffs, on the other hand, framed the case as simply an
ordinary challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, a proper
subject for judicial review. 37 According to the plaintiffs, the political
question doctrine prevents a court from reaching the merits only
when the matter in question is textually committed to a co-equal
branch of government and doesn't involve a separation of powers
claim. 38 The General Assembly could not "instruct" courts on the
constitutionality of its actions, or draw a line beyond which the
court couldn't reach.39
33. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27. As an initial matter, the Chief Justice addressed standing.
The court below had concluded that a majority of the plaintiffs had standing and presented
a justiciable question. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 926. All four members of the majority in
the Supreme Court agreed. Plaintiffs Brian Coppola and David Ball had standing in their
individual capacities as landowners and residents whose property values were negatively
affected, because they lived in a residential district that was, for the first time, subject to oil
and gas operations under Act 13. Id. at 918. The municipalities had standing because each
had a direct, immediate and substantial interest in protecting the environment and quality
of life within its borders. Id. at 919-20. The Delaware Riverkeeper Network had standing
as an association under Pennsylvania law because its individual members suffered threat-
ened injury as residents and property owners in zoning districts that would likely host active
natural gas operations under the Act 13 regime. Id. at 922. Finally, Dr. Mehernosh Khan,
M.D., had standing because Act 13's restrictions on obtaining and sharing with other physi-
cians information about the chemicals used in drilling put him in the untenable position of
having to choose between following the mandatory provisions of the Act or his ethical obliga-
tions. Id. at 924.
34. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 925.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 926.
37. Id.
38. See id.; see also id. at 928 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
39. Id.
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The plurality agreed that adopting the defendants' approach
would mean the General Assembly could effectively prevent the re-
view of any constitutional challenge to its actions by simply defend-
ing it as an exercise of its police power.40 Chief Justice Castille ex-
plained that the passage of laws is expressly limited by the re-
strictions in article III of the Constitution, as well by the rights and
powers reserved to the people.4 1 The court has the capacity and a
duty to determine whether the Constitution requires or prohibits
the performance of certain acts.4 2 Further, he reasoned that the
need for the court to enforce constitutional limitations is greatest
when individual liberties, interests, entitlements, or fundamental
rights are at stake.4 3 Here, the plaintiffs' claims "require[d] nothing
more than the exercise of powers within the courts' province: the
vindication of a constitutional right.4 4
The Chief Justice, writing for the plurality, next turned to the
merits. The lower court had held sections 3215(b)(4) and 3304 of
Act 13 unconstitutional and enjoined the enforcement of both, as
well as sections 3305-3309, which enforced section 3304.45 The
court had grounded its decision in separation of powers and due
process theories regarding zoning regulations and agency decision-
making.46 On appeal, Chief Justice Castille remarked that, "[t]o
describe this case simply as a zoning or agency discretion matter
would not capture the essence of the parties' fundamental dispute
regarding Act 13." 47 Rather, he explained, because the plaintiffs
alleged the law threatened to degrade air, water and the natural,
scenic, and aesthetic values of the environment, the fundamental
dispute involved citizens' rights to quality of life on their properties
and in their hometowns.4 8 In other words, the plaintiffs' interests
implicated the rights and obligations contained in the ERA.
The plurality next endeavored to explain the applicable constitu-
tional paradigm under the ERA. Article III, sections 1 through 27
40. Id.
41. Id. at 927.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 928 (internal citations omitted).
44. Id. at 930.
45. Id. Section 3215(b)(4) allows the Department of Environmental Protection to grant
oil and gas well permit waivers from mandatory minimum setbacks from certain types of
waters. See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3215(b)(4). Section 3304 created a uniform statewide
scheme of regulation of the oil and gas industry. See id. § 3304.
46. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 931. The plaintiffs claimed Act 13 violated the following
principles of provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution: article I, section 27 (ERA); article
III, section 32 (Special Laws); article I, sections 1 and 10 (Takings); as well as the non-dele-
gation, separation of powers, and vagueness doctrines. See id. at 930.
47. Id. at 942.
48. Id.
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of the Pennsylvania Constitution grant the General Assembly
broad and flexible police power, and with it, plenary authority to
"enact laws for the purposes of promoting public health, safety, mor-
als, and the general welfare. ' 49 Nonetheless, the plurality noted,
the power granted the General Assembly is not absolute, but lim-
ited by the constitutional commitment to protect certain fundamen-
tal rights expressly reserved to the people of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania?0 Further, when the state regulates or restricts in-
dividual rights under its police power, it can only do so in a reason-
able and non-discriminatory manner.51
Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution-the Declaration of
Rights-creates an inviolable social contract between the govern-
ment and the people of Pennsylvania. 52 The Constitution protects
rights deemed to be inherent, such as the right to own and use one's
property in any manner that does not result in harm to one's neigh-
bor.53 Article I, section 27 simply enumerates another inherent
right: the right of the people "to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of
the environment. ' 54 Further, the Constitution makes clear that
Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property
of all, including generations yet to come, as the Commonwealth has
an obligation to "conserve and maintain" these resources "for the
benefit of all the people. ' 55
The plurality understood the ERA to accomplish two goals. First,
it "identifies protected rights, to prevent the state from acting in
certain ways," and, second, it "establishes a nascent framework for
the Commonwealth to participate affirmatively in the development
and enforcement of these rights. ' 56 The ERA accomplishes these
goals through three mandates, each contained in its own clause.
First, the text declares the "right" of the people to clean air, pure
water, and the preservation of natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment. 57 Next, the text states that the people,
49. Id. at 946.
50. Id. at 946-47; PA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (power reserved to the people).
51. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 946.
52. Id. at 947.
53. See id. at 948.
54. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
55. Id.
56. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 950. Given the twin purposes, a legal challenge can either
allege the government has infringed upon citizens' rights, or that it has failed in its trustee
obligations, or both. Id.
57. Id. at 951.
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including future generations, share common ownership of the Com-
monwealth's natural resources. 58  Finally, the ERA establishes
the Commonwealth's duties in respect to these commonly-owned
public natural resources, 59 including duties that are both nega-
tive-prohibiting certain governmental action-and positive-re-
quiring "the enactment of legislation and regulations. '6 0
Turning to the first clause, the plurality explained that the right
of the people "to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of
the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment"
limits the Commonwealth's authority to act contrary to the right;
in other words, the Commonwealth may regulate the air or water,
for example, but such regulation must be "subordinate to the enjoy-
ment of the right."6 1 Put differently, "the corollary to the people's []
right to an environment of quality is an obligation on the govern-
ment's behalf to refrain from unduly infringing upon or violating
[it], including by legislative enactment. '6 2 The clause, the plurality
concluded, requires the government to consider the environmental
effect of any proposed action before that action is taken.6 3 Moreo-
ver, the courts may enforce the substantive commitments to main-
tain "clean air" and "pure water," by using as a benchmark of con-
stitutional compliance the ERA's purpose: to guard against actual
or likely degradation of protected public resources.6 4
The plurality viewed the ERA's second clause-stating that
Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property
of all the people, including generations yet to come-as implicating
relatively broad aspects of the environment.6 5 The plurality sug-
gested the lack of further definition indicated an intention by the
ERA's framers to allow for its change over time.66 At present, the
concept might include such tangibles as state-owned lands and wa-
terways, as well as resources affecting the public interest, like am-
bient air, surface and ground water, and wild flora and fauna.6 7
Finally, the plurality interpreted the ERA's third clause as estab-
lishing the public trust doctrine in respect to the natural resources
58. Id. at 954.
59. Id. at 955.
60. Id. at 955-56.
61. Id. at 951.
62. Id. at 952.
63. Id. State and local governments are concurrently bound by this requirement, and,
when faced with a meritorious challenge, the judiciary is obligated to vindicate these section
27 rights. Id.
64. Id. at 953.
65. Id. at 955.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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named in the amendment: these resources form the corpus of the
trust, with the Commonwealth as trustee and the people as benefi-
ciaries. 68 Accordingly, the Commonwealth, including local govern-
ment, has a fiduciary obligation to comply with the terms of the
trust, which the ERA explicitly states requires the conservation and
maintenance of the corpus through two distinct obligations.69 First,
the Commonwealth cannot perform its duties as trustee unreason-
ably by, for example, permitting or encouraging the degradation of
the public natural resources.70 Second, the Commonwealth must
"act affirmatively to protect the environment. '" 71 As well, because
the beneficiaries of the trust include future generations, the Com-
monwealth must treat all beneficiaries impartially, and it must
"balance the interests of present and future beneficiaries." 72
The plurality next applied its understanding to the controversy
at hand. The defendants had argued the case involved an unobjec-
tionable policy decision made pursuant to the General Assembly's
police powers as trustee, following which local government lacked
the authority to articulate a different policy.7 3 By contrast, the
plaintiffs had challenged the extent to which the Commonwealth
had complied with its constitutional obligations.7 4 The plurality
sided with the plaintiffs: though the General Assembly has the au-
thority to alter or remove powers granted municipalities by stat-
ute, 75 it cannot abrogate constitutional commands regarding munic-
ipalities' obligations and duties to its citizens.7 6 Accordingly, the
General Assembly could not command municipalities to ignore their
section 27 obligations, or direct them to take affirmative actions
that would undermine existing protections.
The plurality also concluded that the statutory authorization of a
regulatory regime permitting industrial uses in every type of pre-
existing zoning district was "incapable of conserving or maintaining
the constitutionally-protected aspects of the public environment
68. Id. at 956.
69. See id. at 957.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 958.
72. Id. at 959. The Chief Justice then discussed other considerations of statutory con-
struction, including its legislative history and the circumstances of its enactment and ratifi-
cation, as well as the harm remedied and object attained by its existence. See id. at 959-63.
Next, he discussed the limitations of existing jurisprudence regarding the ERA.
73. Id. at 974.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 977.
76. Id.
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and of a certain quality of life."77 Such a regime, the plurality rea-
soned, would result in some properties carrying a heavier environ-
mental burden than others. 78 As well, other provisions of Act 13
departed from the goal of sustainable development. For instance,
section 3215 required the Department of Environmental Protection
to waive setback requirements on certain bodies of water when a
permit applicant submitted "a plan" to protect the water, and in-
structed the Department to articulate the terms and conditions it
deemed "necessary" for such protection, but did not provide regula-
tors any criteria by which "necessity" should be assessed. 79
Ultimately, the plurality determined the law failed to "ensure
conservation of the quality and quantity of the Commonwealth's
waters and failed to treat beneficiaries equitably in light of the pur-
poses of the trust" established by the ERA.80 It followed that the
Commonwealth had failed to discharge its constitutional duties un-
der the ERA "as trustee of the public natural resources. 81
III
By nearly any measure, the Robinson Township plurality's ap-
proach to the ERA warrants attention, not least for the confidence
with which it contemplates a potentially profound judicial role in
enforcing the ERA-this despite earlier jurisprudence that cast
doubt on just this potential. In the earliest case concerning the
ERA, Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield,8 2 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed an effort by the Common-
wealth to block private parties from constructing an observation
tower near the Gettysburg Battlefield.8 3 No statute authorized
such an effort, and the lead opinion concluded that a provision like
the ERA, which sets out general principles mandating state action,
ought not be deemed self-executing: unlike other provisions in the
Declaration of Rights, the Justices reasoned, section 27 "does not
merely contain a limitation on the powers of government," but, ra-
ther, "expand[s] these powers" by granting the legislature the au-
thority "to act in areas of purely aesthetic or historic concern. '8 4
77. Id. at 980.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 982.
80. Id. at 984.
81. Id.
82. 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973).
83. See id. at 591.
84. Id. at 591-92.
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This view of the ERA-which governed much article 27 jurispru-
dence for decades, as discussed above8 5-likely reflected judicial re-
luctance to assess the validity of challenges brought under the
amendment absent the guidance of policy standards set by the Gen-
eral Assembly. It stands in contrast to the Robinson Township plu-
rality's approach, which embraces the idea that the judiciary has
an independent constitutional obligation to implement the ERA's
provisions.86 The distinctive feature of this approach is the way in
which it treats a nominally positive obligation on the Common-
wealth's political branches-to conserve and maintain the state's
natural resources for the benefit of all the people-as a negative
limitation. In other words, though the ERA fits the definition of a
positive rights provision,8 7 the plurality's approach to its enforce-
ment-at least on the facts of this case-casts the amendment's
substantive provisions as creating limits on the Commonwealth not
unlike those imposed by political rights protections.
The ERA, in short, is like an electron. Recent research confirms
that this elementary particle "appears to be a strange hybrid of a
wave and a particle that's neither here and there nor here or
there."8 8 Whether the electron appears as a wave or as a particle
seems to depend on the way in which we happen to be observing it
at a particular moment-it depends, in other words, upon the cir-
cumstances in which it is observed.
So, too, the ERA: whether it serves to limit or to obligate state
action depends upon the facts. The Robinson Township plurality
held the disputed sections of Act 13 unconstitutional because the
legislature acted without appropriate regard for the potential ef-
fects on environmental concerns.8 9 For instance, as noted above, 90
the plurality concluded that the General Assembly could not com-
mand municipalities to ignore their obligations under the ERA, or
direct them to take affirmative actions that would undermine exist-
ing protections-just as the legislature could not require that mu-
nicipalities ignore or take actions that would undermine the state
constitutional protection of, say, the freedom of expression. In this
85. See supra notes 10-13, 82-84 and accompanying text (discussing past jurisprudence
under the ERA).
86. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 967 (explaining that "branches of government have inde-
pendent constitutional duties pursuant to the Environmental Rights Amendment").
87. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (discussing positive rights provisions).
88. Edward Frenkel, The Reality of Quantum Weirdness, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2015, at
SR9.
89. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 984 (noting "structural difficulties with a statutory
scheme that fails both to ensure conservation of the quality and quantity of the Common-
wealth's waters and to treat all beneficiaries equitably in light of the purposes of the trust").
90. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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sense, the ERA is functioning much like any other negative consti-
tutional right, and its enforcement falls well within the legitimate
reach of the judiciary's authority.
And yet, it can been argued that this kind of rights-enforcement
really amounts to a judicial effort to compel state action-in this
case, at a minimum, legislative consideration of the potential envi-
ronmental effects of legislation.91 Of course, all components of state
government have a continuing responsibility to respect the bounds
imposed by the state's constitution, which means that there exists
a tacit requirement that the legislature consider the effects of a par-
ticular law on the central concerns of any constitutionally-protected
interest that it might implicate, whether that interest be free
speech, religious freedom, or environmental protection. It just hap-
pens that the effect of legislation on the environment is more read-
ily subject to some kind of empirical analysis.
As well, assuming the plurality's approach effectively requires
the Commonwealth to consider in advance the environmental ef-
fects of particular action, that consideration can take many forms.
Legislatures have many tools at their disposal with which to aid
their deliberation of such matters-they may, for example, seek to
"hear from any person or group that is interested in the outcome of
[its] deliberations, '" 92 and from the evidence presented draw some
conclusions about the likely consequences of certain legislative ac-
tions. The important question here is whether future courts facing
challenges under the ERA will choose to closely supervise the legis-
lature's fact-finding-and, if they do, whether the legislature ulti-
mately will tolerate that kind of supervision.
This line of thought leads to a related question: assuming the
legislative consideration of potential environmental impact under
the ERA satisfies a reviewing court, what happens in a case in
which the legislature's ultimate decision to move forward, or to al-
low private parties to move forward, is challenged as nonetheless
violating the ERA? Here, the courts may elect to tread more softly
than the Robinson Township plurality's approach suggests. The le-
gitimacy of the judiciary may be threatened if it is seen as essen-
91. See A First Take on Robinson Township u. Commonwealth, MCGUIREWOODS LEGAL
ALERT, Dec. 24, 2013, at 7 (noting that Robinson Township "arguably requires ... that any
executive, legislative or administrative action be preceded by an assessment of its likely en-
vironmental impact") (emphasis in original).
92. Charles H. Baron, Pleading for Physician-Assisted Suicide in the Courts, 19 WESTERN
N. ENG. L. REV. 371, 372 (1997) (discussing virtues of legislative law-making).
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tially second-guessing these kinds of legislative determinations, es-
pecially after the legislature gave environmental concerns some
kind of appropriate consideration.
The problem is that, notwithstanding the ERA's plain language,
many observers will not see benchmarking the quality of water, air
and other natural resources as a task naturally falling within the
judiciary's institutional competence. Consider again the Gettys-
burg monument case. In a concurring opinion, Justice Roberts in-
dicated that the problem with the Commonwealth's argument un-
der the ERA was that it had not carried its burden to show the pro-
ject in question would have harmed "the natural, historic, scenic,
and aesthetic values of the Gettysburg area."93 This may be the
kind of review to which the Robinson Township plurality's approach
will lead, and it's not at all clear that judges are in a position to
make these assessments absent some external legislative or regu-
latory guidance. History is replete with instances in which a lack
of institutional competence has led courts to abandon close scrutiny
of the substance of lawmaking in areas involving technical, scien-
tific, and economic considerations-in other words, those involving
the kind of policy accommodations and compromises for which
elected legislators rightly are accountable to their constituents.
In light of the questions it raises about the judiciary's capacity to
enforce the ERA's provisions, the Robinson Township plurality
opinion may prove an anomaly, both within and without Pennsyl-
vania. But even if it turns out that all a court effectively can do
under the ERA is determine whether the legislature appropriately
considered the impact of particular public or private action on the
environment, that determination in itself would represent an im-
portant step toward operationalizing the amendment. It would pro-
vide some hope, in the Commonwealth and elsewhere, that environ-
mental and other positive rights may be seen as more than parch-
ment promises. 94 Such determinations also may lead to greater
transparency about legislation affecting the concerns of positive
rights provisions-concerns like the environment, education, and
labor relations-and thus spark public discourse about a legisla-
ture's policy choices. Given the breadth and potential consequences
of competing policy alternatives in these and other areas touched
by state constitutional positive rights provisions, renewed hope that
93. Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d 588, 596 (Pa. 1973)
(Roberts, J., concurring).
94. See Dernbach, supra note 8 (observing that "[e]nvironmental amendments to state or
national constitutions are attractive.., only if they can be applied in a meaningful way").
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legislatures will take these provisions seriously and enhanced dis-
course about public policy choices should not be regarded as small
achievements.

